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Abstract While the paradigm of utility maximisation has formed the basis of the
majority of applications in discrete choice modelling for over 40 years, its core assump-
tions have been questioned by work in both behavioural economics and mathematical
psychology as well as more recently by developments in the RUM-oriented choice
modelling community. This paper reviews the basic properties with a view to explain-
ing the historical pre-eminence of utility maximisation and addresses the question of
what departures from the paradigm may be necessary or wise in order to accommodate
richer behavioural patterns. We find that many, though not all, of the behavioural traits
discussed in the literature can be approximated sufficiently closely by a random utility
framework, allowing analysts to retain the many advantages that such an approach
possesses.
Keywords Random utility maximisation · RUM properties · Behavioural patterns ·
Discrete choice
1 Introduction
Discrete choice models have established themselves as an important tool for the anal-
ysis of individual decision making across numerous fields (see Anderson et al. 1992;
Train 2009, for comprehensive overviews). The normative1 paradigm of utility max-
imisation has served as the basis for the vast majority of discrete choice models reported
1 Founded upon value or subjective judgements about how an economic agent should behave.
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in the literature and, as we shall discuss, there are good reasons why this should be so.2
A historical perspective on this is given by McFadden (2000). Nevertheless, applica-
tions of positivist3 behavioural paradigms that depart from utility maximisation, or
for which consistency with utility may be tenuous, have become more numerous and
have been shown to represent aspects of behaviour that cannot be straightforwardly
explained by utility (e.g. Chorus 2010; Leong and Hensher 2015; Guevara and Fukushi
2016). In this paper we, therefore, attempt to explore the basis on which utility max-
imisation is adopted, what behavioural phenomena have been detected that seem to be
inconsistent with that paradigm and the issues that result from attempting to represent
those phenomena in practical choice models.
The next section of the paper describes the random utility modelling (RUM)
paradigm and how it has been used to model choice. This is followed by a discussion
of behavioural ‘anomalies’ and an overview of efforts to accommodate these in choice
models, looking both at extensions to RUM as well as the use of other model frame-
works in this context. We highlight how some of these alternative structures actually
remain close to RUM, while also questioning whether some of the extensions of RUM
lead to violations of utility maximisation.
2 The use of random utility to model choice
The concept of utility is fundamental to the standard microeconomic theory of con-
sumer behaviour, where consumers are represented as choosing among bundles of
continuously variable quantities of goods. Discrete choice might be seen as a varia-
tion on the standard theory, where consumers are represented as choosing the single
alternative that, from a finite, exclusive and exhaustive set, maximises their utility,
conditional on the constraints affecting the agent, in particular the budget.
In practical implementations of choice modelling, it is necessary to admit that the
analyst does not know all, or indeed perhaps most, of the relevant facts about the agent
to be modelled, such as the agent’s preferences, attitudes, income, exact location, etc.
In particular, the process by which an agent makes choices is unknown to the analyst,
and a paradigm such as utility maximisation is likely to be only an approximation to the
real process used. Moreover, agents’ behaviour is likely to vary, systematically and/or
idiosyncratically. For these reasons, practical models based on most paradigms contain
a random element, such that choice is represented as a probabilistic phenomenon. This
representation acknowledges the existence of uncertainties, but nevertheless allows the
development of rigorous models. Issues of identification may, however, arise, so that
it is often impossible to attribute randomness between the agent and the analyst: for
example, perception error by the agent may be impossible to identify separately from
measurement error by the analyst.
In this section, we first provide an overview of the history of random utility in
choice modelling, before talking about the properties and benefits of the paradigm.
2 The paradigm of utility maximisation also forms the basis of much of the work on continuous and
discrete-continuous choices, but the present paper focusses on discrete choice alone.
3 Founded upon description and explanation of how an economic agent actually behaves.
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2.1 The introduction of random utility to choice modelling
The idea of combining a random element with the concept of utility maximisation
is intuitively appealing. Such models are generally referred to as RUM, a concept
proposed by Marschak (1960) and Block and Marschak (1960), drawing from earlier
work in the field of psychophysics (Fechner 1859). Formally, if we consider an agent
making a choice from a finite set, random utility implies that there is a random vec-
tor (U1, . . . , UJ ) unique up to an increasing monotone transformation such that the
probability of choosing any alternative i ∈ M (where M is the choice set) is given by:
Pi = Pr
(
Ui > U j
)
for all i = j ∈ M.
As originally conceived, RUM was a ‘distribution free’ model (e.g. Regenwetter
et al. 2010), in the sense that utility was conceptualised as a random ordinal vari-
able, but without specific distributional properties. The development that completed
RUM’s journey from theory to practice was to reconceptualise utility as a cardinal
variable, comprising a deterministic element which is observable to the analyst, and
a random element which is unobservable to the analyst and is typically referred to as
the ‘error’ term. By assigning a distributional form to the latter, a ‘parametric’ version
of RUM was developed that readily lends itself to implementation in practical policy
and planning studies (McFadden 1968, but unpublished until 1975).
In some but not all paradigms, it is also admitted that agents may exhibit random
behaviour. Block and Marschak saw RUM as a model of an individual agent engaged in
a discrete choice task, whereby randomness arises from variations in choice behaviour
across independent repetitions of that task. Prompted by the interest of economists in
aggregate behaviour, McFadden re-interpreted RUM as representative of a population
of decision-makers with explicitly varying tastes, each facing a single discrete choice
task. McFadden (1981) argued that the two interpretations are formally equivalent, i.e.
that the probability of a choice made by a specific individual in (conceptually) repeated
experiments also applies to the probability of that choice made by a randomly chosen
individual in an extensive population. Of course, we may in practice have individuals
with both differing tastes and random behaviour.
The primary motivation of Marschak and his associates was to formulate models
that could help in understanding choice processes. In particular, they sought to confirm
through experimental investigation the propensity of decision-makers to adhere to
RUM (e.g. Davidson and Marschak 1959), or at least to choice behaviour consistent
with RUM. They did not seek to relate choice to characteristics of the alternatives
and/or decision-maker, a development which followed some years hence.
Whereas the conventional microeconomic definition of ‘direct’ utility expresses
utility as a function of the quantities of goods consumed, the developing discrete
choice paradigm powerfully exploited Lancaster (1966) re-conceptualisation of goods
in terms of their constituent attributes (potentially encompassing a range of ‘quality’
variables). In this way, modellers were able to link observations of choice to the quanti-
ties of various qualitative attributes characterising the available alternatives. Borrowing
from the microeconomics of duality theory, choice modellers also drew upon the con-
cept of ‘indirect’ utility, to introduce prices and incomes alongside quality variables,
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and this opened the door to two strands of model development and application. First,
choice modelling became established as a key method for non-market valuation, since
it could be used to examine marginal rates of substitution between quality variables
and money, thereby eliciting marginal valuations of the quality variables with money
as the numéraire. Second, through strengthening the theoretical grounding of choice
models in terms of welfare economics, marginal valuations could be aggregated across
both quality variables and individual decision-makers, to yield societal level valuations
of policy or planning interventions.
In early practical applications of RUM for choice, marginal valuations of qual-
ity variables—specifically the willingness to pay for reductions in travel time—were
elicited as a by-product of McFadden (1973) study, but as the principal product of
Daly and Zachary (1975) study. Societal valuations were pioneered by McFadden
(1978). RUM choice was also exploited in the forecasting of behaviour by Domencich
and McFadden (1975), Williams (1977) and Daly and Zachary (1978). Some of these
papers from the 1970s made significant theoretical contributions, which were subse-
quently consolidated within a more comprehensive welfare framework by McFadden
(1981), Small and Rosen (1981) and Hanemann (1982). Further methodological devel-
opments (especially in the shape of more specific econometric specifications of RUM)
and innovative applications then followed across numerous disciplines, especially in
transport.
Thus, for more than 40 years RUM has been applied to serve the two main practical
objectives of choice modelling: forecasting behaviour and extracting valuations, both
as individual willingness to pay and as societal welfare calculations. RUM has also
been used as a tool to investigate the fundamentals of behaviour, but it is in this latter
role that it has been most strongly challenged by alternative paradigms or generali-
sations. Whilst acknowledging possible differences in interpretation—depending on
the normative or positivist dichotomy—these objectives of RUM practice require that
we must have a model that is ‘representative’ of agents’ behaviour. This assumption,
albeit very strong, is essential to give credibility to model applications (Daly 1982).
A key distinction arises here between the model offering an accurate representation
of the choice process (which is not observed) and an accurate prediction of the choice
outcome (which is observed). It is important to note that the latter may not necessar-
ily require the former, but that the criticisms of the framework have focussed on the
representation of process.
In the initial conceptualisations of RUM by Marschak and colleagues, and by
McFadden (1973), the concept of RUM was introduced by construction. That is, the
model was specified by defining a utility a priori. Randomness was then introduced by
making the utility random or by making behaviour a random function of fixed utility
(see, for example, Busemeyer and Rieskamp 2014). The ‘fixed utility’ approach can
always be emulated by adding an appropriate random component to the utility, and
for this reason models with an explicitly random utility have been much more preva-
lent. It is important to note that the inclusion of a random element is a generalisation
rather than a restriction of the general behavioural framework. Trivially, if the vari-
ance of the random element becomes very small, the influence of random effects in the
model becomes negligible. Moreover, the use of the RUM paradigm is an extremely
general approach to modelling behaviour, providing that individual behaviour at each
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moment is consistent with utility maximisation, or that deviations are small enough to
be allowed for by the random component of RUM. Again we note that RUM may be
able to accurately or closely predict outcomes of behaviour that may not be completely
consistent with utility theory.
2.2 Characterisation of RUM
Given a specification of a model in terms of the distribution of the random utilities, it is
theoretically straightforward to calculate choice probabilities by integration, and wel-
fare by further integration. These provide key benefits of the paradigm, a point that we
return to in the next section. Of course, the practical calculation of these measures can
present moderate or severe difficulty in the more complicated cases, especially where
income effects of price and/or income changes are non-linear. However, subsequent
to the initial constructive RUM specifications, analysts began to ask whether models
specified in terms of probability statements or welfare functions could be tested for
consistency with RUM.
In this regard, it is useful to return to our earlier distinction between ordinal and
cardinal (or parametric) RUM. With regard to ordinal RUM, it is well established that
for binary choice probabilities involving up to five distinct alternatives, RUM holds
if and only if the so-called ‘triangle inequalities’ hold (Cohen and Falmagne 1978;
McFadden and Richter 1970a, b, 1991; Fishburn 1998; Cavagnaro and Davis-Stober
2014), i.e.
for any three distinct elements x, y, z ∈ M(where M is the choice set), the binary
choice probabilities P (·) of preferring one alternative over another are given by:
1 ≤ P (x, y) + P (y, z) + P (z, x) ≤ 2 (1)
With regard to cardinal RUM, a fairly comprehensive test in terms of probability
statements is given by Zachary’s theorem (Daly and Zachary 1978; proof given in
Zachary 2012), whilst McFadden (1981) defined a class of models—termed Gener-
alised Extreme Value (GEV) models—that could be shown to be RUM-consistent on
the basis of their welfare functions. More recently, Fosgerau (2013, definition 1) have
defined RUM by a cumulative distribution of utilities that is absolutely continuous,
so that choice probabilities can be obtained. This recent work, which builds on the
key earlier contributions mentioned above, may be taken as a definitive statement
of cardinal RUM. However, it is notable that Definition 1 in Fosgerau et al. (2013)
specifically excludes issues of economic rationality. These issues are introduced later
in the paper where, among other requirements it is specified that utility “may depend
on other variables [...] that include attributes of the discrete alternative and factors that
influence tastes, such as age and family size”. A requirement that the utility of one
alternative should not depend on the attributes of another alternative is implicit but
not stressed. Another key contribution was made by McFadden and Train (2000), who
showed that a fully specified Mixed Logit model is the most general structure and can
approximate any RUM arbitrarily closely. A seemingly ignored fact is that the same
point was made earlier by Dalal and Klein (1988).
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From these contributions, a series of tests can be derived that allow practical models
to be assessed in terms of RUM compatibility and other related properties. Central
among these tests is regularity (Marschak 1960, p. 192), whereby the probability of
choosing any given alternative from an offered set should not increase if the offered set
is expanded to include additional alternatives. Regularity follows from the assumption
that choice is based on utility maximisation, i.e. it is a necessary (though not sufficient)
condition.
Another test which has attracted considerable interest is transitivity, whereby if
alternative A is preferred to alternative B, and B to C, then alternative A should be
preferred to alternative C. Recognising that transitivity is ostensibly a deterministic
property, the discrete choice literature has developed various stochastic interpretations
of transitivity (referred to as ‘weak’, ‘moderate’ and ‘strong’), which relate to the
probability that alternative A is preferred to alternative B, and so on. Whilst none
of these interpretations are necessary for RUM, there is a close relationship between
stochastic transitivity and the triangle inequalities.
Suppose that we can view an individual’s discrete choice as resulting from a com-
plete and transitive preference structure that gives an ordering of preference of the
alternatives. At any moment this ordering is clearly defined but could be the result of
a random process, e.g. it may vary over successive choices by that individual. Then
this preference structure is consistent with utility maximisation (Block and Marschak
1960) and hence preferences are regular, in the sense that the ordering among the ini-
tial set of alternatives would not be disrupted by the addition of further alternatives to
the set. In other words, for a given individual at a given moment, utility maximisation
implies regularity. Integrating over the preference structures, we obtain the result that
irregularity by an individual implies a failure of utility maximisation by that individ-
ual at some moments and that irregularity in a population implies a failure of utility
maximisation by some individuals at some moments.
Since regularity is necessary, RUM implies that the utility difference of any pair
of alternatives may not depend on the attributes of another alternative. Dependence
of the utility difference on the attributes of another alternative can easily bring about
a failure of regularity,4 as a change in the attributes of alternative C may affect the
instantaneous preference (or the aggregate choice probability) between alternatives A
and B. The key feature of utility maximisation in this context is that by choosing an
alternative, the agent enjoys the attributes of that alternative, without reference to the
attributes of any other alternative.
Several of the most interesting behavioural paradigms introduced in recent years
relate the utility of an alternative to its relationship to other alternatives, as dis-
cussed in the following section, but these paradigms are then in some cases clearly
inconsistent with utility maximisation, with all the consequences that follow from
that inconsistency. Consistency with utility maximisation is not achieved by most
implementations of the Mother Logit model (McFadden 1975), nor by popular
recent developments such as Random Regret Minimisation (RRM; see, e.g. Cho-
4 Most often, the condition of ‘independence’ of the utility difference is achieved by making all the utilities
independent. However, the more precise condition on utility differences is important in obtaining appropriate
conditions for reference-dependent models.
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rus 2010). Furthermore, for consistency with utility maximisation the sign of the
utility difference between any two alternatives should not be affected by the addi-
tion/subtraction of alternatives to/from the choice set. This is subtly (but importantly)
different from the ‘invariance’ property (e.g. Batley and Hess 2016), where the
choice probability between two alternatives is invariant to addition/subtraction of
alternatives; this is a property of Multinomial Logit (MNL), but not RUM in gen-
eral.
The situation concerning reference dependence, where choice is affected by fea-
tures established prior to the choice to be modelled, is different. Here, the reference
situation is part of the agents’ preference structure, and the dependence of the utility
of alternatives on features of the reference situation does not affect the consistency
of the model with RUM. Note that this applies even where reference is defined with
respect to a status quo alternative and the choice set includes the status quo alterna-
tive, as the function of that alternative in defining the agents’ preference structure is
distinct from the possibility that the status quo alternative may continue to be cho-
sen.
The most interesting RUMs are of course those in which utility can be represented as
a function of the attributes of the alternatives and conditioned by the characteristics of
the agent. As noted above, by focusing on indirect utility, these may include the price of
each alternative and the income of the agent. However, in an analogous manner to the
more conventional economic context of continuous consumption, the implementation
of indirect utility within discrete choice contexts encounters the classic Marshallian
problem of heterogeneity in the marginal utility of income and the associated issue of
path dependence (e.g. Batley and Ibanez 2013). Maintaining the analogy to continuous
consumption, recognition of this problem has prompted some RUM researchers to
adopt the standard Hicksian solution to path dependence (e.g. Hau 1985; Karlström
and Morey January 2001; Dagsvik and Karlström 2005), which is essentially to convert
the numéraire from utility to money. Unfortunately, this literature has been slow to
develop, and contemporary random utility modelling would seem committed to a
Marshallian framework.
Within this Marshallian framework, the dependence of utility on attributes naturally
leads to the specification of a cardinal utility measure, on which conditions arising
from economic theory may be imposed. For example, it cannot be the case that the price
of an alternative has a positive influence on its utility (unless price is operating largely
as a proxy for quality variables). In addition to these economic tests, conditions may
be applied that arise from behavioural considerations. For example, sign conditions
or relative value conditions may be applied to the values of estimated coefficients.
Testing models in this way can make a valuable contribution to obtaining models that
give good results for whatever objectives the modelling may have.
In summary, by RUM we mean a model in which each alternative has a cardinal
or ordinal utility, expressed in a common numéraire; utility is not known in full by
the analyst but is capable of approximation with error. The model must comply with
the triangle inequalities, must not exhibit preference reversal and, therefore, the util-
ity differences of any pair of alternatives must not depend on the characteristics or
existence of another alternative.
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2.3 Benefits of RUM
The use of the RUM paradigm brings substantial benefits, so that constraining choice
models to that paradigm, where possible, is often found to be beneficial, even though
there may be a loss in explanatory power or in the clarity of theoretical exposition
of the model. In the following section we discuss how some behaviour that is at first
sight ‘non-RUM’ may be approximated by RUM, thereby retaining the benefits of the
RUM approach.
It is important to note that consistency with RUM does not necessarily imply that
behaviour arises from individuals assessing the attributes of the alternatives they face,
deriving utilities and choosing the best-performing alternative. Instead, it is postu-
lated that behaviour that follows the rules outlined above may be characterised ‘as
if’ behaviour followed RUM and the benefits of the RUM approach then follow.
According to this interpretation, RUM could encompass a whole range of behavioural
processes employed in practice, provided these can be reconciled in some shape or form
with utility maximisation subject to constraints. Such behaviour is often described as
‘rational’,5 but it is debatable whether this characterisation is helpful to the discussion.
The key benefit of the RUM approach to the study of choice is the link it gives to
microeconomics. Here there is a large body of theory and empirical evidence offer-
ing methodology and tests of behaviour. Setting the modelling within such a widely
accepted behavioural framework helps in gaining acceptance for the approach, by
providing a well-developed discussion of its strengths and weaknesses. For example,
while microeconomics provides a sound basis for welfare analysis at the level of the
individual, it also draws attention to the difficulty of integrating the measures over a
population and presents plausible ways in which this might be done. It also provides
a theoretically acceptable basis for the estimation of willingness-to-pay measures as
marginal rates of substitution between the price and other attributes of alternatives.
Similarly, for forecasting, RUM offers a credible basis that justifies expectations that
individuals may continue to behave in ways that have been observed to date.
However, there are numerous examples in the literature of criticisms of the RUM
approach, and interest in behavioural features that are not compatible with generally
understood interpretations of RUM. In the following section we discuss a number of
these apparent departures in detail, addressing the key issue of whether extensions or
adaptations to RUM could accommodate or approximate these features, some more
subtle than others. Clearly, our preference is to accommodate more behavioural realism
while remaining, if possible, within the RUM framework with all its advantages.
Two general extensions may be mentioned here. First, it is reasonable to use models
that may be consistent with utility maximisation only within a defined region; provided
that no investigations need to be made outside this region, such models can claim the
advantages of RUM. This would apply, for example, to models in which the impact of
variables such as price changed sign outside the defined region (as would happen with
specific non-linear treatments), or where the structure of the model implied inappro-
priate elasticities outside the region (Börsch-Supan 1990; Herriges and Kling 1996;
5 Hargreaves Heap (1992) defined ‘instrumental rationality’ as ‘...the choice of actions which best satisfy
a person’s objectives’ (p4).
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Batley and Hess 2016). Second, it is possible to incorporate within the modelling
different behavioural paradigms (Hess et al. 2012) that allow for the possibility that
an agent’s behavioural process is unknown, or is itself random. However, this second
extension does not extend the scope of RUM because, in order for the overall model to
be RUM-consistent, it is necessary for each of the components to be RUM-consistent.
3 Behavioural ‘anomalies’ and their treatment in choice models
From a positivist standpoint, a key criticism of utility-based models in the behavioural
economics and mathematical psychology literature (e.g. Kahneman 2003) has been
its inherent assumptions of so-called ‘rational’ behaviour which seems to contradict
many findings from real world observations. However, as already mentioned in Sect. 2,
consistency with RUM does not require agents to behave in a RUM-style process, only
in one that yields choices consistent with it. Similarly, this literature seems to equate
the term ‘rational’ with behaviour consistent with utility maximisation, which is not
necessarily helpful.
There is ample evidence showing that in many contexts, agents’ judgements, pref-
erences and behaviour are at face value systematically irrational (e.g. Kahneman and
Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1974). An important point to make at the outset
is that a decision-maker’s behaviour might be considered rational from the perspec-
tive of that person; what irrational behaviour refers to is a lack of consistency with
behavioural paradigms and rules as set out by the observer or analyst. It is here that
the strong assumptions underlying some of the modelling frameworks can lead to
problems.
Key findings include the following: individuals’ preferences and judgements are
unstable and context dependent (Tversky and Simonson 1993; Ariely et al. 2003; Huber
et al. 1982), individuals are cognitively constrained (Jamasb and Pollitt 2005) and
individuals tend to use different cognitive procedures and rules to deal with complex
decision problems (Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Manzini and Mariotti 2007). It
should be acknowledged that these ‘findings’ are themselves often based on specific
experimental settings which are developed in such a way as to tease out these anomalies
(e.g. thinking of the zero cost example we discuss in Sect. 3.2.1) and these settings
may in fact overstate the extent of such behaviour, particularly in real-world contexts.
It should also be noted that the criticisms raised in these literatures seem to refer
to the utility maximisation paradigm without recognising that the move to random
utility maximisation is in large part motivated by a desire to capture the types of
inconsistencies and idiosyncrasies in behaviour discussed above. Indeed, the field has
proactively sought to address some of these concerns, through refinements of and
extensions to the set of RUMs. This goes back for example to discussions in Ben-
Akiva et al. (1999), a paper which seeks to “discuss the consequences of various
‘anomalies’ of preference elicitation”. This key paper later led to the growing use of
hybrid choice structures (see the extensive overview in Abou-Zeid and Ben-Akiva
2014), an approach that has, however, been exploited primarily for accommodating
attitudes and perceptions in decision making, rather than some of the behavioural traits
we discuss below. Crucially, Ben-Akiva et al. (1999) does not seem to have stemmed
the interest in departures from RUM to accommodate such anomalies.
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A key question we shall return to later in this section is, on the one hand, to
what extent these ‘improvements’ may actually lead to violations of key RUM
assumptions, and on the other hand, how different from RUM structures the new
models actually are. Before turning to the individual phenomena, we focus on the
general notion of context dependence, which is of key interest in behavioural eco-
nomics and mathematical psychology and encompasses many of the issues covered
in Sect. 3.2.
3.1 Context dependence and RUM
We start our discussion by defining the utility that agent n obtains from choosing
alternative j in choice situation t as Ujnt, where, in a random utility framework, this
is made up of a ‘deterministic’ component Vjnt and a random component εjnt. This
deterministic component is defined as Vjnt = g
(
β, xjnt, zn
)
, where β is a vector of
estimated parameters, xjnt are attributes describing alternative j as faced by agent n
in choice scenario t , and zn are characteristics of agent n. Returning to our earlier
discussion concerning sources of randomness in Sect. 2.1, note that this framework
admits both multiple agents and multiple repetitions of a given choice task.
Notwithstanding recent developments in multiplicative error structures (Harris and
Tanner 1974; Fosgerau and Bierlaire 2009), the typical assumption of an additive
error structure means that the probability of agent n choosing alternative i(out of
j = 1, . . . , J ) in choice task t is then given by:
Pint = P
(
Vint + εint > Vjnt + εjnt, ∀ j = i
)
. (2)
As is well known, with an assumption that the error terms εjnt are independently and
identically distributed (iid) according to a type I extreme value (EV1) distribution, this
leads to a Multinomial Logit (MNL) model, with:
Pint = e
Vint
∑J
j=1 eVjnt
. (3)
With more flexible specifications of the error terms, we can move to other members of
the family of Generalised Extreme Value (GEV) models (if there is correlation across
some alternatives in εjnt), Mixed Logit models (in the presence of additional random
error on top of the iid EV1 errors) or Probit models (if εnt follows a multivariate
Normal distribution).
These departures from the most basic assumption about the error structure can
lead to important gains in model performance and may in fact allow the model to
accommodate some of the behavioural phenomena that are central to the discussions
in behavioural economics and mathematical psychology without explicitly describing
them. This is in line with the theoretical discussions in McFadden and Train (2000)
and the empirical results in Hess et al. (2017). While this may not satisfy the desire for
behavioural realism, it allows the model to represent the behaviour closely enough to
produce good predictions while retaining other benefits inherent to RUM structures.
123
Revisiting consistency with random utility maximisation. . . 191
A key question that an analyst needs to consider in this context is which is most
important; the explicit modelling of the behavioural processes or the retention of the
microeconomic framework underlying RUM? This is strongly related to the applica-
tion of the model for valuation and forecasting. If analysts wish to retain the framework
of (2) but explicitly model specific behavioural phenomena that cannot be accommo-
dated in the error structure, then attention inevitably turns to the definition of Vjnt. An
important component in this is the impact that the context in which a choice is made
has on outcome of the choice. As we will see in the later discussion, if the source of
this impact is exogenous to the comparison between the alternatives, then consistency
with RUM can generally be maintained. This is no longer generally the case when the
context effects are driven by the choice set itself.
While interest in behavioural flexibility and realism has grown in recent years, it is
important to remember the early efforts of McFadden (1975) in this context, specifi-
cally with regard to the development of the Mother Logit (or Universal Logit) model,
which will serve as a useful ‘straw man’ against which subsequent developments in
model form regarding context dependence can be assessed. McFadden (1975) intro-
duced this model as:
Pint = e
gint
∑J
j=1 egjnt
, (4)
where gint = fi
(
Vjnt,∀ j
)
, where no constraints are imposed on this function.
Note that the same model can be achieved by replacing Vjnt = g
(
β, xjnt, zn
)
in
(2) with Vjnt = g (β, xnt, zn), where xnt now contains the attributes of all alter-
natives in the choice set, allowing for rich patterns of context dependence to be
incorporated. While McFadden (1975) initially highlighted the potential flexibility
of the Mother Logit framework, McFadden et al. (1977) subsequently noted its gen-
eral lack of consistency with utility maximisation, given the potential for failures
of regularity. McFadden (2000) wrote: “ I called this the mother logit approxima-
tion, and suggested that it could be used as an alternative against which to test IIA.
Because there was no easy way to tell whether a mother logit model was consistent
with RUM, it did not provide a useful setup for estimating general RUM-consistent
models or testing for RUM-consistency.” As we will see in what follows, those
behavioural phenomena that need to be accommodated in a Mother Logit style func-
tional form (albeit that this link is often ignored by authors) will lead to violations of
RUM.
3.2 Behavioural phenomena and their representation in models of choice
We will now provide a brief review of a number of key behavioural phenomena. This
list is not meant to be complete and the inclusion of topics is unavoidably selective.
Each time, we seek to discuss the behavioural relevance of the topic, the likely impact
of not accommodating the phenomenon in our models, and an overview of attempts
(if any) to represent the effect in the choice modelling literature. With regard to the
last point, we specifically look at the implications of such efforts on maintaining
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consistency with utility maximisation. We group the phenomena together according
to whether or not they are theoretically consistent with RUM.
3.2.1 Generally fully consistent
Anchoring effects
Anchoring effects refer to the phenomenon that individuals’ decisions could be
affected by external cues. A crucial initial investigation came in the work of Tversky
and Kahneman (1974), who demonstrated that students’ judgements of the percentage
of African countries in the United Nations were biased towards a random number gen-
erated by a ‘wheel of fortune’. Since then, behavioural economists and psychologists
have found salient and robust anchoring effects in both experiments and real world
choices.
In the context of the choice modelling literature, the main focus on anchoring effects
has been how a previous choice setting can influence preferences in a subsequent choice
setting. A key example comes in value of time work, especially where based on stated
choice data. If a respondent is faced with a choice in task 1 where he/she can purchase
a reduction in travel time at a cost of £x/h, then this may influence his/her willingness
to purchase a reduction at a cost of £year/h (where £y may be smaller or larger than £x)
in subsequent tasks. Anchors may form specifically the first time a respondent faces
a given type of choice, but subsequent choices may refine the anchor. The influence
of anchoring on the value of time has been considered in some depth by VandeKaa
(2005).
The specification of anchors may vary, and an anchor could be formed either by
what a decision-maker ‘sees’ in a given choice task or by what he/she chooses. An
anchor may also be constant (formed the first time a respondent faces a particular
choice) or evolve over time (e.g. changing with each choice situation). If, in each
choice situation, the choice is modelled with a RUM structure, then the actual choice
is consistent with RUM, but the sequence is not consistent with a single definition of
utility, as utility gets redefined over time, either just once for all choices following
the initial choice, or after each choice. This is consistent with the original Block and
Marschak (1960) interpretation of RUM. Either way, such heterogeneity in valuations
over time is not in principle inconsistent with RUM.
Zero cost/price effects
In an example made famous by Dan Ariely’s book ‘Predictably Irrational’ (Ariely
2008), and based on Shampanier et al. (2007), individuals’ choices between two choco-
late products changed substantially when an equal reduction in the cost (i.e. price) of
the two products led to a zero cost for one of the two. Such effects are also visible in
many stated choice surveys where one or more of the alternatives in a choice task have
a zero cost to the respondent, be it in the case of toll road studies (e.g. Hess et al. 2008)
or the numerous environmental economics datasets including a zero cost status quo
alternative (see the discussion on confounding in Hess and Beharry-Borg 2012). The
behaviour exhibited by this effect is not consistent with a linear cost sensitivity, which
is a core assumption in many applications of choice models. However, it can easily be
accommodated through a non-linear specification and does not lead to violations of
utility maximisation.
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Status quo bias
Status quo bias refers to the phenomenon that individuals have strong propensity to
choose the alternative that describes their current situation. It was first demonstrated by
Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988), but is commonly observed in many stated choice
surveys, especially when the status quo alternative is explicitly labelled as such. The
fact that individuals attach undue weight to their current situation does not lead to
any issues from a utility maximisation perspective, and is routinely accommodated in
models. A different issue of course applies if these models are used in forecasting,
where the status quo is unknown. Applications looking at this issue are common in
environmental economics, see for example Meyerhoff and Liebe (2009).
Mental accounting
Mental accounting refers to the cognitive process by which individuals allocate
their overall money budget into different mental accounts. It is a common empirical
finding that money in one mental account is not a perfect substitute for money in
another account, thus violating the principle of fungibility (Thaler 1985). This effect
is commonly observed in transport choice models with multiple cost components (e.g.
different responses to fuel costs and toll costs) and has for example been studied in
a stated choice context by Hess et al. (2012). While this behavioural effect poses
issues from an economic theory perspective, it does not pose any particular issues for
a theoretical RUM-consistent model of choice behaviour.
Elimination by aspects
Elimination by aspects (EBA), which was proposed by Tversky (1972a, b), posits
that an agent successively eliminates alternatives that fail to possess aspects that the
agent finds necessary or important. Noting that the elimination process establishes a
branching choice structure, several authors have suggested similarity with the nesting
structures of McFadden (1978) RUM-consistent GEV model. This suggestion was
investigated in detail by Batley and Daly (2006), who found that there was equivalence
between ‘hierarchical’ EBA (where there is a unique sequence of eliminations to
reach each alternative) and ‘tree’ Nested Logit models (where again there is a unique
choice sequence). Although more general EBA and Cross-Nested Logit models are not
necessarily equivalent, despite the apparent similarity of structure, Tversky (1972a)
presented a much-neglected proof that, by re-interpreting EBA as a ranking model,
general consistency between EBA and RUM can be established.
3.2.2 Not consistent in general or in some cases
Lexicography and extreme sensitivities
Lexicography refers to the case where, typically in an experimental setting, a
decision-maker evaluates the alternatives on the basis of a subset of attributes (e.g.
Sælensminde 2006). Common examples include respondents who always choose the
cheapest alternative irrespective of the other attributes shown, or travellers who always
choose the fastest alternative. Lexicography may also exhibit itself as non-trading if,
for example, respondents always choose the same mode in a transport setting. This type
of behaviour may be consistent with utility maximisation if it reflects true preferences,
i.e. extremely high sensitivities to given attributes, such that a change in behaviour
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would arise only with a sufficiently large incentive. If, however, it is caused by strategic
behaviour in a survey context, violations of RUM may arise. Lexicographic behaviour
may also be the result of choice set complexity, leading to decision makers adopting
processing heuristics, an issue we return to below.
Reference-dependent preferences and loss aversion
The topics of reference dependence and loss aversion are generally attributed to
Tversky and Kahneman (1991) and have become a widely studied topic in choice
modelling in recent years. The central argument is that when individuals evaluate their
response to a given stimulus, i.e. the value of an attribute xjntk (the kth component of
xjnt), this valuation depends not just on the absolute value of this attribute, but also on
its value relative to a reference point, say rnk. For an undesirable attribute, respondents
are expected to react negatively to increases in xjntk and positively to decreases. When
these reactions are symmetrical, we return to the standard specification, where the
contribution to the utility of alternative j is given by βk xjntk (under the assumption of
a linear specification). Loss aversion postulates that losses are more painful than gains
are pleasurable, and we then instead have that the contribution is driven by separate
loss (βk,loss) and gain (βk,gain) parameters βk,loss
(
xjntk − rnk
)
if xjntk > rnk, and
βk,gain
(
rnk − xjntk
)
if xjntk < rnk, where we would expect that βk,loss ≤ 0 ≤ βk,gain
and | βk,loss |≥| βk,gain |.
Empirical support for reference dependence and loss aversion is widespread in the
choice modelling literature (e.g. Hess et al. 2008) and has also led to the develop-
ment of bespoke modelling approaches (cf. de Borger and Fosgerau 2008). What has
received little or no attention is the impact on consistency with utility maximisation.
With reference dependence, the utility of an alternative depends on the characteris-
tics of the alternative and the reference point. It should be clear that if the reference
point is independent of the composition of the choice task, then the inclusion of ref-
erence dependence in a model will not lead to a violation of utility maximisation.
Indeed, the addition of an alternative into the choice set will not change the utilities
of other alternatives, and the probabilities of all existing alternatives (prior to the new
one being added) will not increase—thereby complying with regularity. This applies
whether or not the reference alternative itself is included in the choice task, or indeed
if the reference alternative is the alternative that is being added. If the reference point
changes over time, then preferences will of course change too, but this is not a prob-
lem for utility maximisation. As a final point, if the reference alternative is included
in the choice task, say as alternative 1, then a standard implementation of a model
for such data (as in Hess et al. 2008) is in effect a Mother Logit structure, where, e.g.
gint = ∑k
[
βk,inc · max (xintk − x1ntk, 0) + βk,dec · max (x1ntk − xintk, 0)
]
, where k is
an index over attributes. This is thus an example where a Mother Logit structure is
consistent with utility maximisation, as the utility for alternative i is only a function
of its own attributes and the fixed attributes of the reference alternative. Effectively,
the reference alternative becomes part of the preference structure at the moment of
choice, and the alternatives are evaluated in that preference structure using only their
own attributes.
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Decoy, context and framing effects
The term ‘decoy effects’ has been used to describe a set of slightly different effects,
including asymmetric dominance effects, attraction effects, compromise effects and
phantom decoy effects. Asymmetric dominance effects were first described by Huber
et al. (1982), who found that in a binary choice task, adding a third alternative (i.e.
decoy) that is dominated by one alternative but not the other can shift individuals’ pref-
erences towards the alternative that dominates the decoy. An attraction effect (Huber
and Puto 1983) arises when the decoy is ‘nearly dominated’ rather than ‘fully domi-
nated’ by one alternative in the choice set but not the other, i.e. if it is outperformed by
one alternative on all its characteristics except one, where it only has a small advantage
for the latter. A further possibility is that of a ‘phantom decoy’ effect (Pratkanis and
Farquhar 1992), where the decoy can be ‘seen’ but is unavailable for choice. Finally,
in a compromise setting, the decoy is not dominating or dominated by any alternative,
but has a combination of small advantages and disadvantages in relation to the other
alternatives. Such compromise alternatives can have increased probability of being
chosen when individuals are averse to extreme outcomes.
Decoy effects in discrete choice modelling have been studied by Guevara and
Fukushi (2016) and Rooderkerk et al. (2011), as well as by Chorus and Bierlaire
(2013) in the context of compromise effects. The presence of decoy alternatives will
lead to changes in the relative probabilities of other alternatives and, with the exception
of the phantom decoy which cannot be chosen, their inclusion in the choice set has
the potential to lead to an increase in the probability of one or more alternatives; this
breaches regularity and makes such effects inconsistent with RUM.
Context effects cover a broader range of issues that relate to the fact that the rel-
ative choice probabilities across alternatives may differ depending on the presence
or absence in the choice set of other alternatives. They cover attraction, compromise
and similarity effects, some of which can also be classified under the decoy points
above. Similarity effects are at the heart of the development of nested logit structures
in choice modelling. If the effect is captured purely through the error structure of the
model, and if specific conditions on the nesting structure are satisfied (Batley and Hess
2016), then the model remains consistent with utility maximisation.
Problems arise when the cross-substitution effects are captured through the
observed component of utility, since the size and sign of associated coefficients can
lead to preference reversals. Examples in the mainstream choice modelling literature
include models used for route choice behaviour, where the impact of the overlap of
different routes is captured in the observed utility component. Two popular examples
are the C-Logit model developed by Cascetta et al. (1996) and the path-size approach
of Ben-Akiva and Bierlaire (1999a). Both approaches include in the utility function
of alternative i a measure of the similarity/overlap with other alternatives ( j = i) and
thus open up the possibility of preference reversals as this component depends on the
attributes of other alternatives in the choice set (again in the manner of Mother Logit)
and changes in the composition of the choice set.
Framing effects refer to the phenomenon that individuals’ judgements and decisions
could be affected by changes to the descriptions of the same piece of information.
Framing effects violate the normative principle of description invariance (Tversky
and Kahneman 1981), but do not affect consistency with utility maximisation.
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Regret
Loomes and Sugden (1982) put forward the notion that an individual’s utility is
not only derived from the chosen alternative but also from the regret or the ‘rejoicing’
generated from the differences between the chosen alternative and the alternative
he/she forgoes.
Regret has received widespread attention in choice modelling in recent years, with
the development of successive versions of a Random Regret Minimisation (RRM)
framework (cf. Chorus 2010).
In the most widely used implementation (Chorus 2010), the regret associated with
alternative i in choice task t for agent n is instead obtained as:
Rint =
∑
j =i
∑
k
ln
(
1 + exp [βk ·
(
xjntk − xintk
)]) (5)
where k is an index of attributes. With the assumption of a type I extreme value error
and the notion of regret minimisation rather than maximisation, we then have (with
either (2) or (3)) that:
Pint = exp (−Rint)∑
j=1..J exp
(−Rjnt
) , (6)
It can clearly be seen from (5) that the RRM model is in fact a specific version of a
Mother Logit model, with the utility of an alternative depending on the attributes of
other alternatives, where gint = −∑ j =i
∑
k ln
(
1 + exp [βk ·
(
xjntk − xintk
)])
. RRM
is thus not a novel type of model but remains a Logit model, albeit one that, like most
Mother Logit specifications, is not consistent with utility maximisation. While this
lack of consistency has been acknowledged by authors using RRM, and indeed seen
as an advantage, this link with Mother Logit has not previously been made to the best of
our knowledge. A special case arises when J = 2, where RRM is formally equivalent
to a RUM-consistent Logit model with (5) (cf. Chorus 2010). With RRM, it is easy to
see how the inclusion of an additional alternative can increase the choice probability
of one or more of the alternatives already in the choice set, i.e. the model does not
exhibit regularity, given that the regret needs to be recalculated for all alternatives in
the choice set.
Complexity, simplification of choice tasks and heuristics
A number of authors have addressed the issue of choice complexity, especially in
the context of stated choice surveys (e.g. Rose et al. 2008). These papers have looked
at the impact that the composition of the choice environment, in terms of number of
alternatives, attributes and attribute levels, has on the level of noise in the data (i.e.
model scale) as well as substantive outputs (e.g. willingness-to-pay measures). At the
same time, there is a growing literature in choice modelling looking at how individual
decision-makers process the information describing the choices they face and what
heuristics they may use (e.g. potential attribute ‘non-attendance’). Other work has
looked at the role of choice set generation, where individuals may look at only a
subset of the available alternatives (e.g. Manzini and Mariotti 2014).
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The majority of the above work has been conducted with the use of random utility
models. The focus has generally been on behaviour within a given context and by a
given person, e.g. making the heuristic specific to a given individual. However, if one
makes the link between the literature on choice task complexity and the literature on
choice process, then it is clear that the presence of such effects may in fact lead to
violations of key principles of utility maximisation. As an example, if the inclusion of
additional alternatives into a choice set changes the way in which respondents make
their choice, i.e. leading to the application of a different RUM, and if this effect differs
across alternatives (due to differing attribute values), then the potential for preference
reversals clearly exists, as the utility functions become dependent on attributes of other
alternatives. On the other hand, it is also worth noting the existence of work looking
at the role of inattention (which can link to complexity) and incorporating this in an
Additive Random Utility Model (ARUM) context (cf. Matejka and McKay 2014).
3.3 Overview and potential for forecasting and welfare analysis
Table 1 summarises the RUM-consistency of the specific behavioural phenomena
discussed in Sect. 3.2 above, and each time gives a key recent reference in choice
modelling. The table also indicates whether these phenomena can be incorporated
into forecasting, valuation and welfare analysis. In forecasting, there is inevitably
consideration of a changed situation, which may be described as ‘do-something’ (i.e. a
price or quality change), and this may or may not involve a significant time difference.
While the computation of marginal willingness-to-pay estimates may be possible,
welfare analysis always involves a price or quality change, giving rise to a comparison
of do-something against do-nothing.
We see that, in most cases, the phenomena can be represented within a RUM-
consistent framework estimated for the do-nothing situation (the status quo scenario),
and this makes basic valuation calculations possible in the situation where no major
changes to the choice scenario arise. However, in many cases, it is difficult or impossi-
ble to include them in forecasting, because it is far from obvious how the phenomena
would translate to the do-something situation (i.e. where a significant change is made
to one or more of the alternatives/attributes). This is of course more particularly likely
to happen when there is a significant time difference between do-nothing and do-
something situations. In even more cases, welfare analysis is difficult or impossible,
because of the additional requirement to aggregate measures of welfare change under
the do-something scenario across alternatives and individuals, leading to further non-
linearities.
4 Conclusions
The paradigm of utility maximisation has underpinned the vast majority of discrete
choice models reported in the literature, and there are good reasons why this is so, since
consistency with RUM greatly improves the applicability of models for forecasting
and economic valuation at both individual and societal levels. However, there has also
accumulated a comprehensive literature documenting real-world and/or experimen-
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tal choice contexts that validate alternative behavioural paradigms, and where RUM
seemingly offers a poor description of actual behaviour. Against this background,
the present paper explored the basis on which RUM is adopted, what the alternative
approaches might be and the relative advantages of the various approaches.
Our main conclusion is that the RUM paradigm has served choice modelling well.
If we adopt a normative perspective then RUM can in principle admit a whole range
of behavioural processes employed in practice, provided these are reconcilable in
some shape or form with utility maximisation subject to constraints. On this basis,
RUM is rather more flexible and agile than might appear from a positivist perspective,
since many of the behaviours which have been promoted as ‘non-RUM’ in the liter-
ature can be recast as RUM-consistent or can be approximated by RUM-consistent
models. That said, there remain some behaviours which are intrinsically non-RUM:
these imply behavioural features such as irregularity, non-transitivity or preference
reversal.
We illustrated the above conclusion in relation to several behavioural phenomena
which have attracted particular interest in real world and experimental studies (sum-
marised in Table 1). Arising from this illustration, three considerations are perhaps
pertinent:
• First and foremost, whether or not a given phenomenon is RUM-consistent—the
key violations here are certain forms of reference dependence and simplification
heuristics.
• Second, the practicability of forecasting the phenomenon under the do-something—
this is challenging for many of the phenomena because of their context specificity
to the do-nothing, and the difficulty of transferring the phenomena to the do-
something.
• Third, the challenges of forecasting follow through into welfare analysis—here
they are compounded by additional difficulties associated with variations in the
behavioural phenomena across alternatives and individuals.
Our concluding message is that the developments in both the scientific and non-
specialist literature on behavioural economics have certainly revitalised the field
of choice modelling, raised a number of important issues and contributed to the
development of new approaches. However, there seems to have been an exaggera-
tion of both the ‘inability’ of RUM to accommodate these behavioural phenomena,
as well as the importance of explicitly representing these phenomena (as opposed
to approximating their effects). It remains for individual analysts to decide upon
the relative merits of different approaches, and specifically to contrast the impor-
tance of behavioural realism with the ability to produce outputs that are of
practical use, especially for policy analysis. Finally, a key point in our paper is
that a model does not necessarily need to ‘represent’ a behavioural process in
order for it to demonstrate good performance on data associated with that pro-
cess.
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